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APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENTS ENTERED BY THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, the Hon. L.A. Dever presiding. 
(Trial Court Case No. 040924591) 
Appellant Joel Evans, through his undersigned counsel, submits his Reply Brief to 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("Educators") Brief. 
REPLY TO EDUCATORS5 "STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW" 
Two aspects of Educators' Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review 
section warrant comment. The first is that Educators repeatedly characterizes itself as an 
"independent plan administrator." Educators Brief, pp. 2-4, 12. However, Educators 
never provides any information to justify such a self-serving characterization of its role in 
this matter. In fact, it is clear based on the allegations of the original Complaint and other 
pleadings filed in the case that Salt Lake City Corporation ("SLCC") contracted with 
Educators to provide administrative services for SLCC's disability benefits plan. 
Educators is charged with carrying out the dictates of SLCC. Educators' use of the word 
"independent" to describe its role is simply an empty attempt by Educators to bolster its 
own case. 
The second noteworthy aspect of Educators' Statement of the Issues and Standards 
of Review is its failure to properly analyze the appropriate standard of review in this case. 
Educators first states that a deferential standard of review is appropriate because 
Educators stands in the shoes of the Utah State Retirement Board ("USRB") in providing 
"written documentation which demonstrates that the interpretation or definition [of a 
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benefits program] promotes uniformity in the administration of its systems or maintains 
the actuarial soundness of the systems, plans or programs" (citing Sindt v. Retirement 
Board, 2007 UT 16, ^  5). Educators Brief, p. 3. However, Educators is not the USRB, 
nor does it claim to be. USRB acts as an independent state agency administering various 
systems, plans or programs of governmental entities under, among other statutes, 
PELTDA. U.C.A. § 49-11-201. While an abuse of discretion standard of review may 
apply to the actions of that state agency under some circumstances, it does not follow that 
such a deferential standard of review applies to the actions of Educators, a business 
competing in the private marketplace. 
An abuse of discretion standard of review is especially inappropriate where 
Educators asserts, as it does on p. 3 of its Brief, that it mechanically enforced "...a 
uniform 30-day appeal deadline and a universally applicable requirement that Mr. Evans 
provide information relevant to his disability." If, in fact, Educators is simply rigorously 
enforcing the letter of the law with exactness and regardless of the varying circumstances 
of individual claimants, what "discretion" was exercised by Educators to which this 
Court should defer? 
The second reason for Educators' assertion that a deferential standard of review is 
appropriate is to borrow analysis from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 ("ERISA"). In its analysis Educators fundamentally misunderstands the application 
of a deferential standard of review within ERISA. Educators wrongly states that "federal 
courts review plan administrator's denial of benefits under an 'arbitrary and capricious' 
standard...". Educators' Brief, p. 3. 
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In fact the default standard of review in ERISA is a de novo standard of review. 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. vs. Brack 489 U.S. 101,115 (1989). Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has specifically stated that nothing in ERISA automatically entitles plan 
administrators to a deferential standard of review. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 
U.S. 355, 385 (2002) ("Not only is there no ERISA provision directly providing a lenient 
standard for judicial review of benefit denials, but there is no requirement necessarily 
entailing such an effect even indirectly"). It is only where the language of the document 
that establishes an ERISA plan confers discretionary authority to interpret the terms of 
the plan or determine eligibility for plan benefits on a plan fiduciary that a deferential 
standard of review in the judiciary is triggered. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115. Educators 
makes no attempt to identify any language in the document under which the SLCC 
disability plan is established or operated that contains language conferring discretion 
upon either SLCC or Educators. In fact, the documents that establish the SLCC disability 
plan do not contain any language conferring discretion to interpret the terms of the plan 
and determine eligibility for benefits on either SLCC or Educators.1 
REPLY TO EDUCATORS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Educators repeatedly references that it initially approved Evans' disability benefits 
for the initial 24 month, "own occupation" disability period only, told Evans that his 
benefits would cease after 24 months and that Evans did not timely appeal the 
1
 Educators cites In re: Marriage of Gonzales, 2000 UT 28, % 16, fh.2 for the proposition that "this court should 
therefore follow the federal standard of review applied in reviewing decisions of independent plan administrators, 
even though the plan here is not governed by ERISA." Educators' Brief, p. 3. However, while Marriage of 
Gonzales contains a stimulating discussion of principles involving statutory construction, there is no reference to 
either ERISA or the appropriate standard of review to be applied when reviewing decisions of disability plan 
administrators. 
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determination that his benefits would cease after the initial two year period. Educators 
Brief pp. 6-7, 8, 9, and 19. However, it was impossible for Educators to know on 
September 10, 2002 when it initially approved Evans disability benefits, whether, at the 
expiration of the 24 month "own occupation" disability period, Evans would be disabled 
from "any occupation" and thus be entitled to additional benefits. Moreover, Evans had 
no ability to know what his own physical condition would be at the expiration of the 
initial 24 month period. He had every intention and hope of returning to work, if not as a 
police officer in some other capacity, as soon as possible. It was not until Evans' initial 
two year "own occupation" disability benefit ended in January, 2004, that either he or 
Educators were in a position to meaningfully and intelligently evaluate whether his 
condition justified continued disability benefits for the inability to work in any 
occupation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Evans9 Claims Are Not Barred by His Failure to Comply With Procedural 
Requirements 
The crux of Educators' argument is that it had the ability to set up and strictly 
enforce a variety of hurdles for claimants such as Evans to jump over as part of its claims 
review process. The first hurdle is a requirement for a claimant to appeal an initial denial 
of his claim within 60 days of the decision. Then, if that initial appeal is denied, 
Educators claims the right to require a claimant to file a second level appeal with 
Educators' Board of Directors within 30 days after the denial of the first appeal. If a 
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claimant fails to comply with either deadline, Educators asserts that the claimant loses 
any ability to appeal, arbitrate or litigate the claim. 
Educators argument fails because PELTDA is silent as to any required exhaustion 
of claims review appeals. The statute is not without any reference to time frames. UCA 
§49-21-401(9) requires that claims by employees for disability benefits under PELTDA 
are barred if not commenced within one year from the eligible employee's date of 
disability unless USRB determines that, under the surrounding facts and circumstances, 
the eligible employee's failure to comply with the time limitations was reasonable. Thus, 
not only does PELTDA not impose the sort of short and varying time frames Educators 
insists must be unwaveringly applied, the time frame it does establish for bringing a suit 
for denied disability benefits is within a year from the disability. Even in that situation, 
the USRB has the ability to take into account "surrounding facts and circumstances" in 
allowing a longer period of time for claims to be brought if the claimant's failure to bring 
a claim within a year was reasonable. Id. Thus, both the time frame in the PELTDA and 
the allowance for some flexibility in the enforcement of that time frame are substantially 
different than Educators' scheme. 
The flexibility referenced in UCA §49-21-401(9) with regard to extending the 
time frames within which a claim can be brought for disability benefits is consistent with 
the "notice prejudice" rule found in Utah's insurance code at U.C.A. §31-A-21-312(2). 
That statute allows claims to be brought later than the time frames required in insurance 
policies so long as the insurer cannot demonstrate any prejudice arising from the delay. 
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This discussion of the notice prejudice rule, raised by Evans in his opening brief, brings 
no response from Educators. 
Educators relies on Evans' prior counsel's forthright admission that his 
calendaring error of a 60-day rather than a 30-day time frame for submitting Evans' 
second appeal of the denied claim justifies Educators' refusal to consider Evans' tardy 
appeal. Evans' counsel asked for mercy but Educators was having none of it. And 
despite its request that this Court allow it to rigorously, and without exception, enforce its 
appeal time frames, it identifies no good public policy reasons for imposing such harsh 
penalties on claimants or their attorneys. Not coincidentally, this hard line results in an 
immediate financial benefit to SLCC because it reduces disability benefit payments 
SLCC would otherwise be required to make to worthy claimants. 
Educators effectively seeks to impose two de facto limitation of action periods on 
claimants. Either the first 60-day time frame for the initial appeal of a denied claim or 
the second 30-day time period will certainly trip up some unwary claimants or their 
counsel and unfairly deprive public safety employees of benefits they are worthy to 
receive. Both the terms of SLCC's disability plan and Educators' administration of that 
plan violate both the letter and the spirit of PELTDA. SLCC and Educators' overly 
aggressive approach is unworthy of the public safety employees PELTDA seeks to 
protect. 
Educators argues that the ".. .30-day appeal deadline in the plan is no more 
unreasonable than the 30-day appeal deadline in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure." Educators' Brief p. 16. However, a 30-day appeal deadline in the Utah 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure is not designed for use by the general public and Educators 
is not the Utah state judiciary. The claim review procedures set up for SLCC's disability 
plan will often, if not usually, be utilized by unrepresented claimants. These individuals 
will frequently not appreciate the need to strictly adhere to the time frames, nor will they 
understand the adverse effect on their claims if they do not meet those deadlines. In 
addition, neither SLCC nor Educators is without financial self-interest in winnowing out 
as many claims as possible and saving SLCC money that would otherwise be spent on 
disability claims. Utah's court processes and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure have 
no such self-interest in mind in establishing their deadlines. 
Educators claims that there is logic to its initial 60-day appeal period and its 
second 30-day appeal period because 
.. .the first appeal to the claims review committee—which may require the 
gathering of additional information—is 60 days, a deadline Mr. Evans satisfied. 
The second appeal to the Board of Directors which does not require anything more 
than a short letter—is 30 days, a deadline Mr. Evans did not satisfy. 
Educators Brief pp. 15-16. The problem in Educators' analysis is that neither level of 
appeal mandates the gathering of information not already submitted and in the possession 
of Educators or the claims review committee. Similarly, both levels of appeal allow the 
gathering and submission of additional information. Educators' argument to justify the 
difference between the two deadlines is artificial and fails to pursuade. 
Educators also faults Evans for failing to provide Educators with medical 
information when Evans appealed Educators' termination of his disability benefits after 
the initial two-year "own occupation" time frame. But Evans did challenge the 
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termination of his benefits at the end of the initial 24-month "own occupation" time 
frame. And, regardless of whether he submitted or did not submit new information in the 
time frame that Educators initially requested, he was entitled to a review of the denial of 
his "any occupation" disability benefits by a pair of fresh eyes engaged in impartial 
decision-making rather than the cursory dismissal he received from Educators. 
After receiving the trial court's ruling (Record at 575-578) that Educators had 
never responded to Evans' "any occupation" appeal, Educators sent to Evans a March 22, 
2006, letter denying his disability claim and giving him 60 days to appeal that denial. 
Record at 706. On May 19, 2006, Evans' counsel presented a timely appeal to Educators 
that contained new medical information and analysis to demonstrate that Evans was 
entitled to "any occupation" benefits. Record at 708-722. Educators' counsel responded 
in a letter dated July 7, 2006, and denied Evans' appeal. Educators denied Evans appeal, 
in part, because he had failed to provide the records Educators referenced back in January 
of 2004. Record at 724. The effect of presenting this basis to deny the claim was to 
eliminate the ability of Evans to meaningfully appeal Educators March 22, 2006, letter 
which gave Evans 60 days to appeal. As another basis to maintain Educators' denial, the 
letter also stated that Evans had not participated in a mandatory vocational rehabilitation 
program. Id. Educators' July 7, 2006, letter gave Evans another 30-day period in which 
to file a second appeal. Record at 725. 
Evans counsel filed a timely second appeal in a August 3,2006, letter and in 
subsequent follow up letters and documents presented additional information to prove 
Evans' entitlement to "any occupation" benefits. Record at 698, 734-747. Despite all 
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this, Educators maintained its denial of Evans' claim based on what it claimed was a lack 
of medical evidence. Record at 752-53. Meaningful rationale or analysis by Educators 
for its denial was completely absent in this last denial letter. There was nothing in the 
letter to show that Educators had engaged in any substantive consideration of the 
materials Evans had provided Educators in 2006. It is clear that Educators denied Evans' 
2006 appeal based on the same erroneous application of its "hard and fast" procedural 
time frames that it applied in 2003 in dealing with Evans' first attorney. 
All this information was presented to the trial court in opposition to Educators' 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment in later in 2006. However, the trial court 
granted Educators' motion based on Evans failure to comply with Educators' hair trigger 
deadlines in 2004. Record at 795-796. The unwillingness of Educators to apply claims 
review procedures that were fair and complied with the letter and spirit of the PELTDA 
infected its consideration of all aspects of Evans various disability claims from 2001 
through 2006. 
It is undisputed that both the 2001 version of the statute (U.C.A. § 49-9-102, 
referring to the need for municipalities who opt out of the PELTDA to provide 
"substantially equivalent" benefits) and the 2002 version of the statute (U.C.A. § 39-21-
201(6), requiring that municipalities who opt out of the PELTDA provide "substantially 
similar" benefits to employees) prevent SLCC and Educators from straying far from 
offering a specific, defined package of rights and benefits to employees. Educators 
argues that its imposition of 60 and 30 day time frames to prematurely cut off otherwise 
valid claims by Evans is not a violation of this language from PELTDA. However 
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Educators' short time frames caused a substantive loss to Evans. Its procedural trip 
wires, as applied to the facts of his situation, cause a complete loss of benefits that would 
otherwise be considered on their merits and would likely allow for additional benefits to 
Evans. Thus, the differences between the statute and SLCC's plan, as administered by 
Educator's in this case, is the difference between Evans receiving and not receiving 
benefits. 
With regard to the procedural deadlines, Educators asserts that". ..under 
analogous federal law where a claimant fails to comply with the terms of the disability 
plan it is not arbitrary and capricious to deny benefits, even if the claimant, unlike Mr. 
Evans, would have qualified for benefits had he complied" (citation omitted). Educators' 
Brief, p. 20. But Educators ignores the difference between complying with the terms of 
the plan under which a claimant may obtain benefits based on being disabled (e.g. 
presenting proof of disability, etc.) and complying with a reasonable claims review 
process that is impartially and fairly applied. Evans acknowledges that if he cannot prove 
he was disabled under the terms of the plan, he is not entitled to benefits. But he must be 
given a fair chance to present his proof. At every step in the process, Educators failed to 
provide Evans that opportunity. 
II. Educators Improperly Offset Evans' VA Disability Benefits 
Educators relies on Shepherd v. Diversa-Cvcle Products, 725 P.2d 1317,1318 
(Utah 1986) for its assertion that the 2001 version of the PELTDA rather than the 2002 
version of that statute applies to this case. Shepherd does state that, in a worker's 
compensation setting, the law in effect at the time the injury arises applies to the case. 
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However, it is not difficult to see the distinction that exists for a disability claimant who 
has an ongoing obligation to prove his disabled status and a worker's compensation 
claimant whose right to benefits is tied to the specific time a work-related accident 
occurred. In any event, even if the 2001 version of the Utah code applies to this matter 
through the entire time frame associated with Evans disability, Educators acted 
improperly in offsetting his Veterans Affairs disability benefits. First, as demonstrated 
clearly in Evans Opening Brief, pp. 24-30, Armed Services disability benefits and 
Veterans Affairs disability benefits are not the same thing. Educators resorts to 
reviewing the mission statement of the department of Veterans Affairs to try and equate 
the two. However, this is a scant basis to refute the arguments and authority presented by 
Evans in his Opening Brief. The language of the United States Code, and cases 
interpreting it, is significantly more persuasive than the Department of Veterans Affairs' 
mission statement. Likewise, Feres v. United States, 340 US 135 (1950) simply does not 
get Educators where it needs to be. Ferres dealt with the extent to which the Federal Tort 
Claims Act applies to members of the armed services. It simply doesn't address the 
distinction between armed services and VA disability benefits. 
Educators' second argument as to why it has the ability to off-set Evans' VA 
benefits even under the 2001 statute is that the VA benefits are a form of "employer-paid 
public or private retirement or disability program for which the employee is eligible." 
Educators' Brief, p. 22 (citing U.C.A. §49-9-402(2) (2001)). Educators' argument fails 
for two reasons. 
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First, this argument was never presented by Educators to the trial court in the 
proceedings below. It is well established that issues not properly raised in the trial court 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, den., 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). See, also, Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) 
Inc.v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455, n. 31 (Utah 1993) (refusing to reach new 
points raised for the first time on appeal and declining to honor the distinction between 
"new arguments as opposed to new issues")- The only argument Educators ever made at 
the trial court for why it was entitled to offset Evans' VA benefits was that VA disability 
benefits and Armed Services disability benefits are the same thing. Consequently, 
because Educators' new argument was not raised in the proceedings below, Educators is 
precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal. 
In any event, the argument must fail on its merits. The language referring to 
employer paid public or private retirement or disability programs simply does not on its 
face cover any disability benefits available to or provided through the U.S. government 
arising as a result of military service. This is true because the United States was never 
Evans "employer" in the sense of being either public or private employment. Rather 
Evans military service was a qualitatively different relationship than his employment 
with either a private employer or with his public employer, Salt Lake City, as a police 
officer. 
Second, the framework of U.C.A. § 49-9-402 does not allow Evans' VA disability 
benefits to be equate to "employer-paid public or private retirement or disability 
program" in light of the fact that the same paragraph in the statute already refers to the 
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"armed services retirement or disability programs." Specific language in a statute must 
prevail over more general language if there is conflict between the two. Carter v. 
University of Utah Med. Ctr., 2006 UT 78, ^ J12. The more general reference to 
"employer-paid public or private retirement or disability programs" must yield to the 
statute's specific reference to "armed services retirement or disability programs." 
Educators' argument rises or falls on whether Evans' VA disability benefits falls under 
the "armed services" reference at U.C.A. §49-9-402(2)(c). 
In addition, Educators makes no attempt to analyze or explain the problem created 
for Educators when the trial court ruled that the changes to the statute in 2002 were 
clarifying rather than substantive. Record at 1075-76. The amendment to the statute in 
2002 makes it much more clear that Evans' VA benefits fall outside the scope of the 
offsettable disability benefits identified in the statute. If those changes in the statute 
simply clarified the intent of the 2001 version of the statute, there is reason to project the 
more clear meaning of the 2002 amendments back to the legislative intent in the statute 
as it existed in 2001. 
III. Given Educators' Pursuit of Litigation, The Arbitration Language in the 
Plan is Unenforceable 
Educators' final argument is that the appeal presented by Evans' regarding the 
court's ruling on arbitration are moot because those claims were adjudicated by the 
district court in favor of SLCC which is in privity to Educators and thus is dispositive in 
Educators' favor also. The reasons that the court's ruling on arbitration are erroneous are 
addressed more specifically in Evans' Opening Brief and in Evans' Reply Brief to SLCC. 
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However, Educators' argument on this point is noteworthy because Educators 
acknowledges it was the agent for SLCC and that its action in pursuing litigation 
aggressively from 2004 until the present against Evans are imputed to SLCC. If, as 
Educators argues, there is a principal-agent relationship between SLCC and Educators, it 
substantially strengthens Evans' waiver argument regarding the choice by SLCC and 
Educators to pursue litigation rather than arbitration as a method of resolving the 
differences between the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Evans served both his country and Salt Lake City honorably for many years. He 
was disabled by different injuries and conditions arising out of those periods of service. 
The repeated actions of Educators to reduce and, ultimately, to terminate his benefits 
prematurely, violate the requirements of the PELTDA. The trial court's rulings in favor 
of Educators should be reversed. 
DATED this 2^ day of July, 2010. 
K- • <c . o ? ' 
Brian S. King / 
Attorney for Appellant ' 
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